herciv

On peut imaginer beaucoup de modules d'optimisation autour d'une coque commune ?

Alliance poussée par la nécessité, l'impossible retour en arrière si trop de pays sont vassalisés par les us.. C'est vrai pour les deux larrons du couplé fr/all

Repris par cabirol : direction de programme France. https://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/le-futur-avion-de-combat-europeen-va-decoller-industriellement-en-janvier-2019-798120.html L'Espagne pourrait rejoindre le Scaf.

D'un autre côté le f-35 laisse une place importante à l'eurofighter entre autre en Italie, Uk et Espagne. De là que les belges complètent leur commande ...

Confirmation pour la Slovaquie : elle achète F-16 (à la demande de l'OTAN ?) "“We want to see America as a leader in the free world, as they did for 70 years,” Ondrejcsák said. “We hear a lot here [at Halifax] about the values-based international order, but it’s very real for us.”" https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/11/18/with-f-16-buy-slovakia-cutting-off-russian-hardware/?fbclid=IwAR3jWsFK6ZvM0lg7xSoR0Yz2d8HebmmwE-iLByTVpZIW4umQft8RsQDTYa8

Une enquête sur les conditions de rédaction du RFP belge : Le journaliste Stavros Kelepouris est intérogé par Cabirol. Tout le monde en prend pour son grade, la méthode française et le contrôle démocratique belge. https://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/la-belgique-a-achete-un-avion-furtif-sur-une-decision-de-l-otan-stavros-kelepouris-knack-797911.html

Un petit éclairage concernant la "vitesse commerciale" à ne pas confondre avec la "vitesse moyenne". La première inclus tous les temps nécessaire à aller d'un point à un autre en particulier les arrêts alors que la seconde n'inclus pas ces arrêts. Quand vous prenez un moyen de transport ce qui vous intéresse c'est le temps total pour aller d'un point A à un point B, incluant donc tous les ralentissement, les arrêts et les ruptures de modes de transports. Augmenter une vitesse commerciale revient donc le plus souvent à supprimer des arrêts. Dit autrement, faire 1000 kilomètres/heure ne sert à rien sur des trajets de quelques kilomètres ni de quelques dizaines de kilomètres. Autre point important : il semble que le niveau d'interconnexion envisageable entre les Hyperloops n'est pas abordé clairement. Pourtant le simple fait d'envisager un cadencement montre que les interconnections seront à envisager de façon équivalente à celle d'un métro mais à l'échelle d'un pays comme la France voir comme l'Europe. D'autre part si l'Hyperloop est un projet enterré, il faudra également retirer la bretagne et le massif central des destinations possibles, les projets enterrés dans ces régions étant notoirement onéreux voir impossible. A l'échelle de l'Europe les alpes et les Pyrénées poseront un défi extrêmement contrariant sauf si on envisage un tube à l'air libre mais là le défis est politique, il faudra les faire accepter par la population. Il y aurait la solution de Bertin, beaucoup moins consommatrice en génie civil, mais la SNCF a déjà tranché il y a 50 ans et a choisi le TGV. Pour résumer je n'arrive à envisager des modes de déplacement terrestre à plus de 1000 km/h très consommateur en géni civil, comme l'Hyperloop, qu'à l'échelle européenne et uniquement entre les très grande métropoles (plus de 1 millions d'habitants) pour générer des volumes de passagers nécessaire à justifier un ROI suffisant.

Tiens un article qui pourrait te plaire sur le poids des f-35b pour l'atterrissage vertical/semivertical. Et dessous d'un atterrissage semi vertical en f-35. https://fightersweep.com/10696/watch-the-uk-navy-invented-a-new-way-to-land-f-35s-with-heavy-payloads-on-their-carriers/

Lien inactif

Armée européenne : convergence franco -allemande. https://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/armee-europeenne-un-tabou-est-leve-797783.html

C'est moi le fournisseur.

C'est vraiment une folie. ils vont devoir gérer 600 avions avec 5 ou 6 standard matériels différent (donc des compatibilités différentes ) qu'ils vont ensuite devoir rétrofiter s'ils veulent les avoir au meilleur standard. Jusqu'à maintenant on a : nouvel EODAS nouveau CPU nouvel EW Aucun n'arrivera en même temps. Ensuite il y a l'intégration qui devra se faire ou non au US et donc forcément avec une indisponibilité plus ou moins longue surtout si tout n'est pas prêt en même temps. Quel foutoir !! On nous dit que les 8 premiers f-35 belges devront rester au US jusqu'en 2023 /2024 pour la formation mais en fait c'est pour les rétrofits. Donc si les retrofits ont du retard et ben les belges (et les autres) seront servi d'autant plus tard.

Pour ceux qui ne connaissent pas les mini oled ; microoled.com fait des écran de 10 millions de pixel en 0.6'' Petit rappel : la nouvelle architecture informatique de HARRIS ne sera pas prête avant 2021. DOnc noua avons potentiellement 195 F-35 qui seront obsolète à peine sortie d'usine … si il n'y a pas de retard sinon ils seront tous obsolètes. The new hardware and software technology, to be operational on the F-35 by 2021, includes seven racks per aircraft consisting of 1,500 module components, including new antennas and weapons release systems. https://www.foxnews.com/tech/f-35-combat-missions-now-have-operational-threat-library-of-mission-data-files

Il peut faire les deux mais l'autonomie déjà pas très grande en est d'autant réduite.

Déjà annonccé sur d'autre fils mais pas ici je crois : commande de 255 F-35 (block 4) ?) en LRIP 12 13 et 14. La loi permettant les block buy a donc dû passer (je n'ai rien vu). https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/lockheed-receives-go-ahead-for-next-f-35-batch-us-navy-orders-more-workhorses-bahrain-is-locked-on-viper-acquisition-041077/ ▪ 64 F-35As for the U.S. Air Force livraison à partir de 2020 donc juste à temps pour profiter du block4 prévu pour mars 2020. ▪ 26 F-35Bs for the U.S. Marine Corps livraison à partir de 2020 idem ▪ 16 F-35Cs for the U.S. Navy livraison à partir de 2020 idem ▪ 89 F-35As and F-35Bs for ally countries. livraison à partir de 2020 ▪ 60 F-35As for foreign military sales. à partir de 2022 The F-35A, used by the U.S. Air Force, is the most common version of the jet and needs a runway for take off. The F-35B has vertical take-off and landing capabilities, like a helicopter, and the F-35C is specifically designed for aircraft carries. The foreign military sales program provides jets to Israel, Japan, South Korea and Belgium, according to Lockheed Martin. In July the company delivered fighters to Turkey over the objection of some in Congress.

Le rapport du DOD est fait. Ellen LORD vuet discuter avec le congrès. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-usa-lockheed/pentagon-report-on-turkeys-f-35-program-delivered-to-congress-idUSKCN1NK33T

Mes enfants sont tous en primaire et l'enseignement de l'histoire est très mais alors très lacunaire. Concernant l'enseignement des gaulois ça dure un cours ou deux et les cartes par contre montrent bien que la gaule n'est pas la France.

@ftami Aurais-tu une table dénombrant le nombre de f-35 par version ?

Acquisition = tabou, uniquement location. Ca les décideurs ils adorent.

Ca ne risque pas puisqu'il faut au moins 80000 ans de séparation pour commencer à observer des différences génétiques visibles chez l'être humain. Donc à l'échelle de l'histoire ... Certes surtout que la "Gaule" comprenait la suisse et la Belgique. Lui ne parle pas d'histoire mais de communauté de pensée (qu'elle soit vrai ou fausse n'a pas d'importance) ce qui compte c'est qu'elle soit commune.

Un peu d'histoire et quelques rapports du DOD : Pour faire simple tout a doublé (temps, coût de développement et coût unitaire) 2001 GAO-02-39 • $34.4 billion • 10 years • $69 million Start of system development and demonstration approved. Critical technologies needed for key aircraft performance elements are not mature. Program should delay start of system development until critical technologies are mature to acceptable levels. DOD did not delay start of system development and demonstration, stating technologies were at acceptable maturity levels and that it will manage risks in development. 2005 GAO-05-271 • $44.8 billion • 12 years • $82 million The program undergoes re-plan to address higherthan-expected design weight, which added $7 billion and 18 months to development schedule. We recommended that the program reduce risks and establish executable business case that is knowledge-based with an evolutionary acquisition strategy. DOD partially concurred but did not adjust strategy, believing that its approach was balanced between cost, schedule, and technical risk. 2006 GAO-06-356 • $45.7 billion • 12 years • $86 million Program sets in motion plan to enter production in 2007 shortly after first flight of the nonproduction-representative aircraft. The program was entering production with less than 1 percent of testing complete. We recommended that the program delay investing in production until flight testing shows that the Joint Strike Fighter performs as expected. DOD partially concurred but did not delay start of production because it believed the risk level was appropriate. 2007 GAO-07-360 • $44.5 billion • 12 years • $104 million Funding reduced for the first two low-rate production buys, thereby slowing the “ramp-up” of production. Progress was being made, but concerns remained about undue overlap in testing and production. We recommended limiting annual production quantities to 24 a year until flying quantities were demonstrated. DOD did not concur and stated that the program had an acceptable level of concurrency and an appropriate acquisition strategy. 2008 GAO-08-388 • $44.2 billion • 12 years • $104 million DOD implemented a Midcourse Risk Reduction Plan to replenish management reserves from about $400 million to about $1 billion by reducing test resources. We found that the new plan increased risks and recommended that DOD revise it to address concerns about testing, management reserves, and manufacturing. We determined that the cost estimate was not reliable and recommended a new cost estimate and schedule risk assessment. DOD did not revise the risk plan or restore testing resources, stating that it will monitor the new plan and adjust it if necessary. Consistent with a report recommendation, a new cost estimate was prepared, but DOD did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis. 2009 GAO-09-303 • $44.4 billion • 13 years • $104 million The program increased the cost estimate and added a year to development but accelerated the production “ramp-up.” An independent DOD cost estimate projected even higher costs and further delays. We concluded that moving forward with an accelerated procurement plan and use of cost-reimbursement contracts was very risky. We recommended that the program report on the risks and mitigation strategy for this approach. DOD agreed to report its contracting strategy and plans to Congress and conduct a schedule risk analysis. The program reported completing the first schedule risk assessment with plans to update semiannually. The department announced a major program change reducing procurement and moving to fixed-price contracts. 2010 GAO-10-382 • $49.3 billion • 15 years • $112 million The program was restructured to reflect findings from a recent independent cost team and independent manufacturing review team. As a result, development funds increased, test aircraft were added, the schedule was extended, and the early production rate decreased. Costs and schedule delays inhibited the program’s ability to meet needs on time. We recommended that the program complete a comprehensive cost estimate and assess warfighter and initial operational capability requirements. We suggested that Congress require DOD to tie annual procurement requests to demonstrated progress. DOD continued restructuring, increasing test resources, and lowering the production rate. Independent review teams evaluated aircraft and engine manufacturing processes. Cost increases later resulted in a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Military services are currently reviewing capability requirements, as we recommended. 2011 GAO-11-325 • $51.8 billion • 16 years • $133 million Restructuring continued with additional development cost increases, and schedule growth; further reduction in near-term procurement quantities; and a decreased rate for future production. The Secretary of Defense placed the short takeoff and vertical landing variant (STOVL) on a 2-year probation, decoupled STOVL from the other variants, and reduced STOVL production plans for fiscal years 2011 to 2013. We concluded that the restructuring actions were positive and, if implemented properly, should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Concurrency of development, test, and production was substantial and provided risk to the program. We recommended that DOD maintain funding levels as budgeted; establish criteria for STOVL probation; and conduct an independent review of software development, integration, and test processes. DOD concurred with all three of the recommendations. DOD lifted STOVL probation, citing improved performance. Subsequently, DOD further reduced procurement quantities, decreasing funding requirements through 2016. The initial independent software assessment began, and ongoing reviews were planned to continue through 2012. Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports and DOD Actions 2012 GAO-12-437 • $55.2 billion • 18 years • $137 million The program established a new acquisition program baseline and approved the continuation of system development, increasing costs for development and procurements and extending the period of planned procurements by 2 years. Extensive restructuring placed the program on a more achievable course. Most of the program’s instability continued to be concurrency of development, test, and production. We recommended that the Cost Assessment Program Evaluation office conduct an analysis of the impact of lower annual funding levels, and that the program office conduct an assessment of the supply chain and transportation network. DOD partially concurred with conducting an analysis of the impact of lower annual funding levels and concurred with assessing the supply chain and transportation network. 2013 GAO-13-309 • $55.2 billion • 18 years • $137 million The program continued to move forward following a new acquisition program baseline in 2012. In doing so, the program incorporated positive and more realistic restructuring actions taken since 2010, including more time and funding for development, and deferred procurement of more than 400 aircraft to future years. The program was moving in the right direction but must fully validate design and operational performance and at the same time make the system affordable. We did not make recommendations to DOD in this report. DOD agreed with GAO’s observations. 2014 GAO-14-322 • $55.2 billion • 18 years • $135 million The services established initial operational capabilities dates in 2013. The Marine Corps and Air Force are planning to field initial operational capabilities in 2015 and 2016, respectively, and the Navy plans to field its initial capability in 2018. Delays in developmental flight testing of the F-35’s critical software may hinder delivery of the warfighting capabilities to the military services. We recommended that DOD conduct an assessment of the specific capabilities that can be delivered and those that will not likely be delivered to each of the services by their established initial operational capability dates. DOD concurred with our recommendation, and officials stated that they are in the process of conducting the assessment. 2014 GAO-14-778 Not reported DOD was developing several plans and analyses that will make up its overall F-35 sustainment strategy, which was expected to be complete in fiscal year 2019. The annual F-35 operating and support costs were estimated to be considerably higher than the combined annual costs of several legacy aircraft. DOD had not fully addressed several issues that affect affordability and operational readiness. Operating and support cost estimates may not be fully reliable. GAO recommended that DOD develop betterinformed affordability constraints; address three risks that could affect sustainment, affordability, and operational readiness; and take steps to improve the reliability of its cost estimates. DOD concurred with all but one recommendation and partially concurred with the recommendation to conduct uncertainty analysis on one of its cost estimates, stating that it already conducts a form of uncertainty analysis. 2015 GAO-15-364 • $54.9 billion • 18 years • $136 million Since the 2012 rebaselining, DOD has made changes to its F-35 procurement plans on an annual basis. The program also competed with other high-priority DOD programs for funding. In 2013 and 2014, DOD deferred a number of aircraft, extending the length of the program and increasing funding liability in the future. The continuing changes in F-35 procurement plans indicate that the analysis done to support the program’s 2012 baseline did not accurately account for future technical risks or funding realities. We recommended that DOD conduct an affordability analysis of the current procurement plan that reflects various assumptions about technical progress and funding availability. DOD concurred with the recommendation and stated that it accomplishes an analysis of the program’s current procurement plans with various assumptions about technical progress and funding availability every year as it conducts reviews for the budget process. 2016 GAO-16-390 • $55.1 billion • 18 years • $130.6 million DOD planned to begin what it refers to as a block-buy contracting approach that was anticipated to provide cost savings. In addition, DOD planned to manage the follow-on modernization program under the current F-35 program baseline and not as its own separate major defense acquisition program. The terms and conditions of the planned block buy and managing follow-on modernization under the current baseline could present oversight challenges for Congress. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense hold a milestone B review and manage follow-on modernization as a separate major defense acquisition program. DOD did not concur with our recommendation. DOD viewed modernization as a continuation of the existing program and the existing oversight mechanisms, including regularly scheduled high-level acquisition reviews, will be used to manage the effort. 2016 GAO-16-439 Not reported The Marine Corps declared initial operational capability in July 2015, while the Air Force and Navy plan to declare initial operational capability in 2016 and 2018, respectively. F-35 pilots and maintainers identified potential functionality risks to the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), and DOD lacks a plan to address these risks as key milestone dates approach. We recommended, among other things, that DOD develop a plan to address ALIS risks. DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a plan to address ALIS risks, and work was under way that would form the foundation of the plan. In 2016, the Joint Program Office completed an ALIS Technical Roadmap identifying five key areas for ALIS modernization and sustainment. In addition, an ALIS Training Evaluation (ATE) Summary of Findings report was completed identifying 23 areas for improvement across the ALIS Training curricula. The top eight improvement areas are on track to be completed by the end of calendar year 2017 to align with the fielding of ALIS version 3.0. 2017 GAO-17-351 • $55.1 billion • 18 years • $130.6 million The DOD F-35 program office was considering contracts for economic order quantity of 2 years’ worth of aircraft parts followed by a separate annual contract for procurement of lot-12 aircraft with annual options for lot-13 and lot14 aircraft. However, as of January 2017, contractors stated they were still negotiating the terms of this contract; therefore, the specific costs and benefits remained uncertain. Program officials project that the program will only need $576.2 million in fiscal year 2018 to complete baseline development. At the same time, program officials expect that more than $1.2 billion could be needed to commit to Block 4 and economic order quantity in fiscal year 2018. GAO recommended DOD use historical data to reassess the cost of completing development of Block 3F, complete Block 3F testing before soliciting contractor proposals for Block 4 development, and identify for Congress the cost and benefits associated with procuring economic order quantities of parts. DOD did not concur with the first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third while stating that it had finalized the details of DOD and contractor investments associated with an economic order quantity purchase and will brief Congress on the details, including costs and benefits of the finalized economic order quantity approach. 2017 GAO-17-690R $3.9 billion 5 years Congress has mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that the Secretary of Defense submit a report by the end of March 2017 containing the basic elements of an Acquisition Program Baseline for the F-35 Block 4 and also required that GAO review DOD’s report. DOD plans to take an incremental, knowledge-based approach that will develop capabilities in four increments. While DOD has broadly established an incremental, knowledge-based framework for its modernization acquisition strategy, DOD officials noted that they are reassessing key cost, schedule, and capability aspects of the approach. As a result, the start of follow-on modernization has been delayed. DOD provided technical comments. 2017 GAO-18-75 Not Reported DOD is facing sustainment challenges that are affecting warfighter readiness. These challenges are largely the result of sustainment plans that do not fully include key requirements or aligned (timely and sufficient) funding. DOD is taking steps to address some challenges, but without more comprehensive plans and aligned funding, DOD risks being unable to fully leverage the F-35’s capabilities and sustain a rapidly expanding fleet. GAO recommended, among other things, that DOD revise sustainment plans, reexamine metrics and ensure that it has sufficient knowledge of costs and technical characteristics before entering into performance-based contracts, and improve communication with the services about sustainment costs. DOD concurred with these recommendations and identified actions that it would take in response

Source GAO F-35 Performance du programme par rapport aux paramètres de fiabilité et de maintenabilité, en date d'août 2017 Metrica F-35A F-35B F-35C Fiabilité - mesure la probabilité de mener à bien une mission d'une durée moyenne. ● ● ● Nombre moyen d'heures de vol entre deux défaillances (conception contrôlée) - mesure le temps écoulé entre deux défaillances qui sont directement attribuables à la conception de l'aéronef et qui sont considérées comme pouvant être réparées avec des modifications de conception. ● ◓ ● Temps moyen de réparation - mesure le temps qu'il faut à un mainteneur pour réparer un composant ou un dispositif défectueux. ◓ ◓ ● Heures-homme de maintenance par heure de vol - mesure le temps moyen consacré à la maintenance planifiée et non planifiée par heure de vol. ● ◓ ● Nombre moyen d'heures de vol entre deux opérations de maintenance - également appelé mesure de fiabilité logistique, mesure le temps écoulé entre la maintenance, les inspections imprévues et les interventions d'entretien, y compris les consommablesc. ○ ○ ○ Nombre moyen d'heures de vol entre deux démontages - mesure le temps qui s'écoule entre les démontages de pièces de l'aéronef en vue de leur remplacement dans la chaîne d'approvisionnement. ○ ○ ○ Nombre moyen d'heures de vol entre deux pannes critiques - mesure le temps écoulé entre deux pannes qui entraînent la perte d'une capacité d'exécuter une mission critique. ○ ○ ○ Temps moyen d'entretien correctif pour les défaillances critiques - mesure le temps qu'il faut pour corriger les défaillances critiques. ○ ○ ○ Légende : ● : Le système métrique est proche ou supérieur aux objectifs actuels. ◓ : Le système métrique est proche ou supérieur aux objectifs minimaux ○ : Le système métrique est inférieur aux objectifs Source : F-35 du bureau de programme, évaluation des données sur les entrepreneurs. | Chaque mesure est mesurée à l'aide d'une moyenne triennale et fait l'objet d'un rapport mensuel ; ce tableau résume l'examen par l'équipe conjointe d'évaluation de la fiabilité et de la maintenabilité des données sur la croissance de la fiabilité et l'amélioration de la maintenabilité de novembre 2009 à août 2017. bLa fiabilité de la mission est un paramètre clé du rendement. Il, ainsi que tous ces paramètres, seront évalués au cours de l'essai et de l'évaluation opérationnels initiaux. Les pièces consommables sont des articles non réparables ou des pièces de réparation qui peuvent être jetées plus économiquement qu'elles ne peuvent être réparées ou qui sont consommées en cours d'utilisation (tels que filtres à huile, vis, écrous et boulons). Traduit avec www.DeepL.com/Translator source GAO F-35 Cellules 2012, 2016 et 2017 Les livraisons et les heures de main-d'œuvre ont généralement été améliorées en termes métriques. 2012 2016 2017 Total des aéronefs livrés 29 46 66 Nombre moyen d'heures de travail par F-35A livré 108 355 47 269 41 541 Nombre moyen d'heures de travail par F-35B livré 107 998 61 928 57 152 Nombre moyen d'heures de travail par F-35C livré _a 65 187 60 121 Nombre total moyen d'heures pour mise au rebut, reprise et réparation par avion livré 20 125 7 797 6 237 Traduit avec www.DeepL.com/Translator

Très intéressant cours d'économie. Mais pourquoi voler dans ces conditions ?

Les UK vont doubler leur flotte de f-35B. Je ne sais pas comment ils vont payer mais c'est leur problème. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-double-f-35-fleet-with-17-jet-order-defence-secretary-announces

C'est quoi cette étude ? Une façon de dire oui aux Français ? Un putsh ?