Akhilleus

Bon Pour les pertes j'ai fait un decompte rapide avec les pertes chiffrés par Oryx en comptant equipage complet par vehicule (3 par tank, 10 par APC/IFV, 4 par VL, 2 par camion log, helico full y compris transport etc) et j'arrive a 8993 soldats "tués" (avec un delta de 10% vu que j'ai fait ca de tete et a la louche) Donc dans les 9000 a 10000 pertes Si c'est 100% par vehicule. Ce qui n'est jamais le cas Avec la limitation du BDA du blog d'Oryx Vous pouvez faire pareil Ca tournera entre 9 et 10K de pertes Encore une fois si c 1 vehicule avec 100% de son chargement humain ce qui parait disproportionné Mais ca donne une idée

Sauf qu'en cherchant bien ca semble venir du KP v Ukraina et pas du KP v Rossya (qui déjà à l'air de se poser là en terme de crédibilité d'après wiki, c'est dire) Donc du coup, gros doute

Si C'est chiffre à chiffre les déclarations du MoD Ukrainien Du coup, crédibilité de la source ?

Haute Intensité Ca remet les choses en place (et oui, je pense les chiffres plutot fiables, plus que les estimations ukrainiennes qui sont surévaluées, c'est de bonne guerre) On peut compter d'ailleurs moitié moins probablement pour les ukrainiens (ils ont avoués 1300 morts dans leurs forces armées, il y'a une paire de jours ce qui me parait pas mal sous évalué, de 50 à 75% - ce qui recouperait peu ou prou les évals US et UK sur leurs pertes) 10000 morts, 16000 blessés d'un coté 4000 à 5000 morts de l'autre selon les chiffres US/UK, probablement 10 à 12000 blessés (en défense, meilleur circuit EVASAN) 12,5 à 15% des forces armées russes, 7 à 8 % des forces armées ukrainiennes au tapis en 3 semaines Et un total de 15000 morts, 25 à 30000 blessés cumulés Sans compter les civils C'est une autre échelle et un autre paradigme Et rétrospectivement, on a aussi évité ca en Centre Europe/Guerre froide Les estimatons US ont pas mal fluctué (c'est passé de 10000 à 6000 puis 8000 il y'a effectivement 5 à 7 jours.....je l'ai dit ici mais 10000 me paraissait beaucoup.....avec du recul on en était effectivement pas si loin

Pertes russes qui auraient fuité : 9,861 tués, 16 153 blessés

Au micro echelon, OK Pour le rens de théatre et de coordination des échelons supérieurs, ama l'apport de l'OTAN est primordial

cough cough, ELINT/SIGINT/IMSAT quasi en temps réel fourni par l'OTAN/les 5 eyes/les USA cough cough Alors les moyens civils, bon, c'est gentil mais faut pas nous faire croire que le rens ukrainien c'est du DIY

Et bizarrement on retrouve des errements vu en 40 (Guerre d'Hiver) et 41 jusqu'en 43 : infanterie mal formée (sauf quelques unités spécifiques) mauvaise coordination entre corps d'armée mauvaise prévision sur la durée des opérations défauts logistiques sur les approvisionnements clés défauts dans les transmissions/communications défaut de l'appui feu aérien (un peu compensé par le sur usage des hélicoptères) dissociation des objectifs politiques et militaires Du coup on est pas tant HS que cela Pour ceux qui se demandaient si il y' avait un usage de mines

quelqu'un a regardé les courbes de contamination, parceque là on a dépassé un point d'inflexion et on repart à la hausse depuis 1 semaine .....

Autant pour moi, j'ai décalé d'un niveau Un LT sera chef de section

Pour la frappe sur le centre commercial de ce matin (*attention, je n'excuse rien, je constate sur la base d'une photo rapportée dans un tweet plutot neutre d'ailleurs*)

GV : grenadier voltigeur (le fantassin quoi) CE : chef d'équipe (Caporal/Sergent) ACDG : Adjoint au Chef de groupe (Adjudant/Adjudant Chef) CDG : Chef de Groupe (Sous lieutenant/lieutenant)

C'est pas clair Des photos de soldats ukrainiens déployant leur drapeau à Makariv sont dispos sur la toile mais semblent daté du 16 Mars

Il y'a aussi un truc c'est que les ACDG et CDG se permettent souvent du matériel de meilleur qualité que le GV de base (sacs à dos par exemple). Du coup ils sont reconnaissables à 1000 m

Du coup, on revient (encore une fois) aux fondamentaux cad que des blindés ne doivent se déplacer qu'une fois le chemin ouvert par l'artillerie (grosse conso de mun et de ressources pour l'artillerie automotrice) et accompagnés d'infanterie débarquée avec du mordant et protégée un maximum contre les antichars (donc des VCI plus lourds, donc plus chers et plus consommateurs de carburant)

Contre offensive ukrainienne en court à l'Ouest de Kiev, sur Makariv, Makovyshche en direction de Berezivka

Le choix c'est un système rechargeable avec un grenadier qui porte le tube et 2 ou 3 grenadiers qui portent les recharges Ou un mix de tubes à usage unique pour l'ensemble des personnels de la section, du 66 mm (LAW, Zolja; RPG18) aux plus forts diamètres (NLAW, RPG32, AT4CS) Dans le premier cas, tu as une section antichar dédiée et une versatilité des têtes mais un encombrement et pas nécessairement une utilité sur un combat antichar appuyé ou c'est plutot du scoot and shoot plutot qu'un engagement de plusieurs minutes Dans le second cas, pour un encombrement minimal, tu dotes toute la section d'infanterie de moyen anti véhicules par nécessairement optimaux face à des MBTs mais largement suffisant face à des APC/VCI C'est un choix mais il semble que la seconde option soit intéressante au vu du RETEX ukrainien Par contre ce n'est possible que grâce à la prodigalité des alliés (ca demande et consomme du tube à usage unique en grande quantité et on sait aussi que le biffin de base va balancer tout ce qu'il a sous la main et pas nécéssairement avec les besoins décris dans le manuel, par exemple usage des tubes en anti points d'appui ou en anti personnel)

A lépoque de la FRR, on aurait procédé de même..... et probablement autant si ce n'est plus de casse Les russes ne pouvaient politiquement s'offrir le luxe d'une campagne aérienne de 40 jours. Il n'est pas certain qu'on puisse s'offrir ce luxe à tout bout de champ. Du coup, en entrée de théatre on se retrouverais dans la même situation

A 260+ MBT détruits, 270 IFV détruits et 220 APC détruits, on serait à poil Il nous resterait 0 chars, 50% de notre force d'IFV (si tant est qu'on puisse comparer un VBCI et un BMP2/3). et 70% de notre force théorique d'APC..... Autant dire une force blindé/mécha hors de combat

Ce qu'il semble manquer (en dehors des défauts patents de l'armée russe : faible capacité de combat débarqué, manque d'infanterie de choc, logistique déficiente, problèmes de coordination entre grands corps) c'est une bulle aéroterrestre d'accompagnement efficace associée à des systèmes de GE créant une couche de protection supplémentaire notamment contre les drones y compris d'origine civile utilisés très largement par les ukrainiens Pourtant les russes possèdent des systèmes que nous n'avons pas (brouilleurs déployés par LRM, systèmes de GE mobiles) mais ils semblent sous employés Peut être parceque leurs réseaux de communication ne sont pas assez durcis y compris contre leurs propres moyens

les déployements aéro/hélicoportés ont été essayés 2 fois; à Hostomel et à coté de Nikolaev les 2 fois, ca a été un foirage Il est peut être temps de se rendre à l'évidence, des forces légères déployées par des moyens vulnérables dans un fort environnement MANPADs et AA, c'est un peu suicidaire

C'est un peu le problème des opérations dans cette zone et qu'on a un peu oublié de notre coté : le nombre et la largeur des coupures humides qui apparentent à chaque fois une traversée à un débarquement de vive force avec nécessité de mise en place d'une tête de pont à élargir avec les difficultés et risques afférents

Certes Mais encore faut il que ca ne dérive pas. Or on sait tous ce qui se passe réellement dans une ambiance d'hystérie collective on on voit des saboteurs partout (oui il y'en a, après la proportion ?) et des traitres/5e colonne sous tous les matelas (oui, il, la proportion ?). Il 'ya pléthore de vidéos de vindicte populaire/lynchage. Il y'a une paire de vidéos de tirs fratricides. Il y'a des négociateurs éliminés. Ce genre de situation en général ce n'est pas bon pour des voisins qui ne peuvent pas se sentir ou des politiciens /entrepreneurs qui dérangent aussi .... Et puisqu'on est sur le fil militaire, ca doit également participer à désorganiser les chaines de commandement, les remontées d'info et l'organisation des unités

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Rien à battre, tu trolles, tu paie, tu spam tu paie, t'es pas content, tu te desinscrits Et juste pour ta gouverne........... On Thursday evening, Roman Giertych, former Deputy Prime Minister of Poland (2006-2007), shared an interesting theory on Facebook called Orbán's Plan. The article has since been picked up by several Polish newspapers. In his reflection, Giertych seeks an answer to the reasons for the anti-EU alliance between the Hungarian and Polish governments and also offers a new perspective on the current Russia-Ukraine war. According to Giertych, there was a Hungarian-Polish-Russian secret plan to partition Ukraine. According to the plan, the Russian army in the current war would have had to rush very quickly to seize the largely Russian-speaking half of Ukraine east of the Dnieper. In a few days, they would have marched into Kiev without any meaningful resistance, overthrowing President Zelensky and his government. However, they did not want to invade the areas west of the Dnieper, because they expected substantial resistance from there, which would have required a much larger operation with many more troops. The plan would have been for the Polish and Hungarian armies to enter the western part of Ukraine as peacekeepers, fearing a flood of refugees. Giertych even imagined that this might have been requested by the politicians in western Ukraine themselves, so that they would have soldiers from NATO members rather than having to go to war with the Russians. The Poles could have taken control of most of north-western Ukraine from Lviv, while Hungary could have secured peace in Transcarpathia. Under the plan, the partition of Ukraine would then have been perpetuated, giving Polish and Hungarian leaders the chance to become heroes at home by enriching their countries, cementing their power forever. According to Giertych, this conquest was prepared by the Hungarian and Polish governments' constant search for conflict with the US and the EU. They have engaged in endless debates about the role of the EU court and castigated US influence so that when the time comes to take territory, Western disapproval and cooperation with the Russians will not be such a bizarre turn of events, either at home or abroad. Giertych speculated that the anti-Western gestures were also signals to Moscow that the Hungarian and Polish governments were controlled by reliable allies. Moscow's interest would have been to create a neutral zone between Russian-controlled territory and Germany. According to Giertych, Orban discussed war plans with Polish leaders at meetings of far-right European parties in Warsaw last December and in Madrid at the end of January this year, including Le Pen, who is running for president of France - this time on a Hungarian bank loan rather than a Russian one - and who is campaigning with a Hungarian bank loan. By then, European leaders had already been informed by the US government that the Russians would certainly go to war against Ukraine, with warnings to that effect having gone out as early as November. The final touches to the plan are theorised to have been put in place during Orban's visit to Moscow on 5 February, when he held five hours of talks with Putin, only to announce that MVM and Gazprom might sign up for some more gas with each other in April. Putin said after the meeting that NATO had been expanded after 1997 at the cost of lies. Viktor Orbán took note without a word of the Russian president's claim that his country should not be a member of the Western military alliance. Only the secret plan failed, according to Giertych, because Ukraine unexpectedly resisted the Russian onslaught with a fierce resistance, and Russian-speaking eastern provinces and cities are still fighting heroically, even after three weeks. Seeing this, public opinion in the West and in Poland became strongly pro-Ukrainian, and the Polish government let go of the partition plan. In fact, it not only let it go, but even took the lead in defending the Ukrainian cause. Kaczynski, the chairman of the ruling party, and Prime Minister Morawieczki showed with their visit to Kiev on Tuesday that they now believe in a completely different scenario. Giertych has moved from the extreme right to the centre Giertych said the migrant crisis on the Belarusian-Polish border in November was already a window dressing to allow the Polish army to line up on the eastern border and prepare the public for military action to prevent a refugee crisis. This is also why the Hungarian army was mobilised towards the eastern borders, which was ordered by Defence Minister Tibor Benkő on 22 February, two days before the outbreak of the war. At the time, he had already said that armed groups might drift into Hungary, i.e. the Hungarian military leadership expected the Ukrainians to suffer a total defeat in a war that had not even begun, and that armed men would flee across the border. Giertych is an odd figure in Polish public life, for example, Endre B. Bojtár, a prominent expert on Polish politics, called him a "fascist gone right" in an article last year. He became a member of parliament as chairman of the Polish League of Families, an EU-sceptic party, and after Kaczynski's election victory in 2005 he entered a coalition with them, serving as deputy prime minister and education minister for a year. At the time, he pursued hard right-wing policies, including proposing that homosexuals should not be allowed to teach in state schools. Then he broke with his allies and after ten years he appeared in Brussels as a lawyer alongside Donald Tusk. Since then, Giertych has been fiercely attacking the PiS government. Recently, it emerged that his phone was hacked with Pegasus software, which he claims was spied on by the Polish government, causing a major scandal in Poland. In his recent essay, Giertych writes that in 2011, at a church event in Rome, he had already discussed Ukraine with Orban, who had used very harsh words to berate his eastern neighbour. Giertych does not present any evidence to support his theory, but argues that the plan follows so logically from the foreign policy pursued by the two governments for years that no further explanation is needed. Perplexing circumstances Giertych's idea may be the product of a wild imagination, and it may not even have a kernel of reality. However, there are some circumstances which, if fictional, can easily be supported by real events. On Tuesday, for example, Viktor Orbán made a speech in Kossuth Square that would lead an unprepared listener to believe that Hungary is a neutral state and is not a member of NATO or the EU. The Prime Minister also proclaimed equal distance from Moscow, Brussels and Washington - as if the new neutral zone between Russia and Germany had already been created, as Giertych said it should have been after the partition of Ukraine. The Slovak press had also raised the possibility of a secret Orbán-Putin deal immediately before the war. Karel Hirman, energy expert and member of the board of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, wrote about this on 6 February, explaining that the previous day Viktor Orban had discussed the redrawing of borders with Putin in Moscow. Hirman was formerly an energy adviser to the Ukrainian government, and his article was protested by the Hungarian ambassador in Bratislava and the chairman of the Party of Hungarians in Slovakia. In 2014, the world was already buzzing with a similar theory In March 2014, when the Russians occupied Crimea, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the deputy speaker of the Russian parliament, wrote a letter to the Hungarian, Polish and Romanian governments, allegedly suggesting that Ukraine should be divided and Hungary could have Carpatho. The letter was reported by a Polish TV station, but Zhirinovsky's party denied that it contained any specific reference to partition. In the summer of 2014, Zhirinovsky raised the issue again, and then openly said that Carpathian is not Ukrainian territory, but part of Hungary. Zhirinovsky is officially an opposition politician in Russia, but that doesn't really matter much there, you can't be in the front line for decades against Putin's wishes. Zhirinovsky predicted the current war almost to the day last December when, in a speech to parliament, he predicted an attack on Ukraine at 4 a.m. on 22 February. The Russians finally attacked at 4 a.m. on 24 February. On 6 May 2014, at the inaugural session of the new Hungarian Parliament, Viktor Orbán paid particular attention to Transcarpathia: "The Hungarian question has been unresolved since the Second World War. The Hungarian cause is a European cause. Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin have dual citizenship, they have community rights and they also have autonomy. This is our position, which we will represent in international politics. The situation of the 200,000 Hungarian community living in Ukraine, which must be granted dual citizenship, must be granted the full range of community rights and must also be given the opportunity for self-government, gives all this a near topicality. This is our clear expectation of the new Ukraine that is taking shape, and which otherwise enjoys our sympathy and support in its work to build a democratic Ukraine." Apart from the vagueness of the first sentence, this claim does not seem too bold, but for some reason it has caused a great deal of reluctance, not in a neighbouring country with a significant Hungarian minority, but in Poland. A week later, Donald Tusk (then Prime Minister of Poland) brought up Orbán's speech at a press conference and said that the idea of Hungarians in Transcarpathia was not uttered at the right time and in the right place, because: "Today, when we are witnessing the dismantling of Ukraine, the attempt to tear the country apart, such a statement is worrying." A few days later in Bratislava, Tusk raised the issue again in Orban's presence, essentially accusing his Hungarian counterpart of spreading Russian propaganda. For some reason, Orbán's speech demanding autonomy for the Hungarians of Transcarpathia stuck with the Americans. "Now is not the time to open a debate on the autonomy of Hungarians living in Ukraine," he said, although at the time the Hungarian government did not even raise the issue. András Simonyi, the former Hungarian ambassador to Washington, gave an interview to the weekly newspaper Weeks on 31 October 2014, where he was asked, among other things, what bothers the Americans so much about the Orbán government's policy on Russia. He ended his answer by saying: "So I suspect there are a lot of things at stake here. It includes unrealistic dreams that this will bring us a positive outcome when Ukraine is carved up by the Russians and we get Carpathia. It will not. But sadly and defencelessly we may be left alone, leaving the Hungarian people of Transcarpathia in a much worse situation than they are in now." Also in the autumn of 2014, former Polish Foreign Minister Radislaw Sikorski said in an interview that he was aware that Russian President Putin had offered Poland to partition Ukraine as early as 2008, and that he would have ceded the city of Lviv to the Poles. The interview caused a huge scandal, with the Kremlin calling it a fantasy and former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk strongly denying it. In the end, Sikorski backtracked, although he did not retract the allegation itself, only that the conversation he had re-enacted did not take place in 2008, and not between Tusk and Putin. Viktor Orbán's speech in Tuscany in the summer of 2014, in which he proclaimed an illiberal regime and praised, among other things, the strengthening of Russia, ended like this: "The question now is, Ladies and Gentlemen, but the answer is not for me, should we be afraid of such a situation, where anything can happen, or should we be filled with optimism? Since the current world order is not exactly to our liking, I think we should rather think that the era of anything can happen that we are facing now, although many believe that it brings uncertainty and that it can be a bad thing, at least it also holds so much opportunity and chance for the Hungarian nation. So, instead of fear, cowering and retreating, I propose courage, forward thinking, rational but courageous action to the Hungarian community in the Carpathian Basin, and indeed to the entire Hungarian national community scattered around the world. It could easily be, after anything, that our time will come."