[Afghanistan]

[Babou]

Les sections "Potemkine" de l'armée de terre

On se souvient des villages Potemkine, ces décors en trompe-l'oeil que le ministre russe aurait fait construire pour Catherine II afin de lui épargner le spectacle désolant de son pays. En va-t-il aujourd'hui de même dans l'armée de terre ? Son chef d'état-major nous confiait récémment que la section à quatre groupes était le pion de base lors des opérations. Las ! Voici, tel quel, le  témoignage d'un militaire que nous avons reçu ce weekend :

"Je rentre  de Canjuers ou l'on a du faire une "démo " pour le CEMA. Ce qui me fait rire (jaune) c'est que pour cette démo on a du passer en section à 4 groupes ( détachées d'autres compagnies ) au pied levé, alors que l'on travaille depuis 3 mois en section à 3 groupes et que l'on travaillera en kapissa à 3 groupes. Tout ça pour quoi? Pour ne pas faire mentir le CEMAT qui une semaine avant, avait fait cette déclaration.

Le but de la manoeuvre : se mentir à nous même... Pourquoi montrer à nos chefs une manière de travailler qui ne sera pas appliquer dans la réalité?  C'est bien dommage de montrer aux " décideurs " de l'armée que tout va bien et que tout ira bien, quand ce n'est pas le cas".

http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/ c'est de mieux en mieux chaque jour :-\

[Gibbs le Cajun]

http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/ c'est de mieux en mieux chaque jour :-\

article 1 :le chef à toujours raison.

si le chef se trompe se referrait à l'article 1 ...

comme d'hab ...

:'( :-\ .....

[g4lly]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/03/man-dogs/

Man Dogs

In David Galula’s 1964 book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, he states:

“The ideal situation for the insurgent would be a large, land-locked country, shaped like a blunt-tipped star, with jungle-covered mountains along the borders and scattered swamps along the plains, in a temperate zone with a large and dispersed rural population and a primitive economy.”

Mr. Galula described Afghanistan almost perfectly. Instead of jungle-covered mountains are some of the most extreme folds on planet Earth: The “abode of snow,” the Himalaya. Afghan elevations dwarf Mount Rainier. By comparison, the great Colorado Rockies are the Pygmy Snow Hills. Meanwhile, down in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, Galula’s “swamps” are the “Green Zones,” where most of the current fighting occurs.

Yet the experienced Mr. Galula omitted a crucial factor that describes the Afghan war: A heavily armed, warring amalgam of peoples, whose national sport and pastime is guerrilla warfare. British officer John Masters variously described in Bugles and a Tiger: My life in the Gurkhas that life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness for some tribesmen includes vendettas, guerrilla warfare and lots of guns.

This weekend, on Saturday night, mass murderers struck. Taliban terrorists used bombs and other weapons in Kandahar City to murder about 35 people. They wounded another five dozen, and damaged about forty homes, according to reports. Enthusiasm to commit wholesale murder is one of the enemy’s prime weaknesses.

About 12 miles from the suicide attacks on Saturday night, is the runway at Kandahar Airfield, where operations continue every minute of the day.

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael’s dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/

[collectionneur]

Je suis retombé sur un vieux Raids de juin 1991 ou il y a un article sur l'Afghanistan.

Au moins 25 ''grands'' chefs de guerre tentent de se coordonner pour abattre le gvt d'alors, une multitude de chefferies, des pakistanais et des égyptiens qui joue les instructeurs et pilote les chars capturés, tirs de Scuds à l'aveuglette par le gvt communiste de Kaboul (5 mai 1990, un Scud contre un bus, 105 morts), un pont aérien soviétique de 20 à 50 avions à Kaboul pour le soutien logistique.

Mine de rien, la situation à l'époque était plus ''létale'' pour la population civile que la guérilla actuelle.

[Serge]

article 1 :le chef à toujours raison.

si le chef se trompe se referrait à l'article 1 ...

comme d'hab ...

:'( :-\ .....

Je ne suis pas d'accord avec la description "Potemkin". Les chefs ne sont pas dupes car cette démonstration a été gérée de sorte de défendre l'idée de section quaternaire auprès du CEMA.

Il ne s'agit en rien d'une mascarade.

[Babou]

Mais donc en Afgha ils sont donc pas en section quaternaire.. (on en discutait pas mal un moment..me souvien plus du topic :-X)

[Serge]

En effet, jusqu'alors les sections étaient ternaires. Ça vient de changer.

[Babou]

ça changera autre part que sur les textes...? :-X

ils changeront leur mode d'action en OPEX alors..?et quand ça..?

[Gibbs le Cajun]

Je ne suis pas d'accord avec la description "Potemkin". Les chefs ne sont pas dupes car cette démonstration a été gérée de sorte de défendre l'idée de section quaternaire auprès du CEMA.

Il ne s'agit en rien d'une mascarade.

okay ,donc sa serait plus de défendre l'idée de section quaternaire en faisant une démo ,mais se qui me tarasbusque un tantinet ,s'est pourquoi certain jugent l'idée qui n'est même pas encore adopté par le CEMA ?

on à l'impression qu'on récupére une section pour la manip (enfin vu comment s'est écrit ).

maintenant ,s'est peut-être une maniére d'emmener le régiment quasiment complet en afgha avec 3 compagnies en mode quaternaire .

je pense que dans un sens ,sa permettré d'avoir le pion manquant en afgha au niveau tenu du terrain ,et manoeuvrabilité .

on augmentent la puissance de feu ,etc ...

[Serge]

Quelques éléments de réponse en vrac:

okay ,donc sa serait plus de défendre l'idée de section quaternaire en faisant une démo

Oui, c'est l'idée. Montrer au CEMA (pro des sous-marins et non de la ranger) pourquoi on "tractione" depuis longtemp pour envoyer des sections quaternaires en Afghanistan.

Georgelin le voulait. Son successeur doit CONTINUER à défendre cette idée.

,mais se qui me tarasbusque un tantinet ,s'est pourquoi certain jugent l'idée qui n'est même pas encore adopté par le CEMA ?

L'idée est validée depui très longtemp.

Le problème de son application vient de 3 facteurs:

- les régiments ont du mal à réaliser leur effectifs théoriques (qui est calculé en quaternaire). C'est ici une logique de recrutement et fidélisation.

Il y a plus grave:

- IL EST IMPERATIF de comprendre qu'un déploiement de force est un engagement de dépenses. Bercy alloue une enveloppe, l'EMA fait avec. Un repas à 3€50 est de la qualité de 3€50. Si demain, on donne 5€, c'est festival. Donc, je vous laisse imaginer ce que signifie: passer de 3 à 4 groupes. Le budget alloué lui ne bougera pas.

- passer de 3 à 4, c'est augmenter de 30% un effectif. Or, le total des effectifs sur le theatre a une taille dictée par l'Elysée. Si l'EMA dépasse de 1 l'effectif autorisée, il reçoit dans l'heure un coup de fil du CEM particulier de la présidence qui dit:" c'est 3700, pas 3701."

on à l'impression qu'on récupére une section pour la manip (enfin vu comment s'est écrit ).

Oui, c'est ça.

maintenant ,s'est peut-être une maniére d'emmener le régiment quasiment complet en afgha avec 3 compagnies en mode quaternaire .

Non, leur mandat stipule 3 compagnies en ternaire.

C'est juste le moyen de faire une démonstration de ce qu'est le quaternaire au profit du CEMA qui ne connait pas toutes les réalités des armées.

je pense que dans un sens ,sa permettré d'avoir le pion manquant en afgha au niveau tenu du terrain ,et manoeuvrabilité .

on augmentent la puissance de feu ,etc ...

Une section à 4, c'est puissant. A 3, c'est très efficace mais la structure du groupe français est une catastrophe. Tout comme l'existence du groupe Eryx.

[Serge]

Je vous propose l'exercice suivant:

imaginez une compagnie en ternaire (30 hommes).

Elle a:

- 3 sections de combat,

- 1 section d'appui (1 groupe TE, 1 groupe Milan, 1 groupe mortier)

- 1 section commandemant,

- 1 observateur d'artillerie,

- 1 équipe mécano,

- 1 équipe santé.

Pour le même effectif et le même coût, vous passez les sections à 4 groupes donc 40.

Que faites-vous?

[g4lly]

Apres Marjah, comme préalable, l'opération Kandahar est déjà en cours ...

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gO2JiCYlDmYJn3bf_jr1Ew_s8IiQ

US operations have already started in Kandahar: commander

(AFP) – 9 hours ago

WASHINGTON — US operations to push back Taliban forces around Kandahar have "already begun" and will steadily build in coming months, the commander of US and NATO troops in Afghanistan said Wednesday.

General Stanley McChrystal told reporters that the US-led offensive on the Taliban's spiritual heartland had started with initial military and political efforts, including operations designed to secure key roads and districts surrounding the southern city.

"And instead of putting a date certain on which there would be a climactic military operation, I tell you, that process has already begun," McChrystal said by teleconference from Afghanistan.

The general said the operation "will ramp up in the weeks and months ahead" and would last for "a significant time period."

His comments came after the Taliban claimed responsibility for a major bombing attack on Saturday that killed 35 people in Kandahar, which the insurgents said was a response to the US-led offensive.

"This was to sabotage the operation and to show we can strike anywhere, any time we want," a Taliban spokesman, Yousuf Ahmadi, said earlier.

Kandahar was the Taliban's base during their rule of the country, which ended with a US-led invasion in 2001.

The city has emerged as a pivotal battleground, with NATO officers hoping to deliver a damaging blow to the insurgency on its home territory.

McChrystal also said the Taliban appeared rattled by the recent arrest of the insurgency's top military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Pakistan.

He said the capture in February of Baradar "seems to have shaken the confidence of some of the Afghan Taliban leadership."

"We see indications that they are trying to figure out what way ahead that they should plot," he said.

Ambassador Mark Sedwill, the NATO civilian representative in Afghanistan, told the same teleconference the Taliban appeared to be "recalibrating" as pressure from coalition forces and Pakistan was "changing the calculus."

McChrystal said safeguarding the roads in and out of Kandahar was a crucial part of the offensive, and the US military had deployed more unmanned surveillance aircraft and other resources to combat roadside bombs planted by the insurgents, he said.

"If you control the environs around Kandahar, you go a long way to controlling Kandahar."

He said coalition forces, including members of a US Army Stryker brigade outside Kandahar, had made some progress in securing the roads.

But he predicted the Taliban "will do everything they can to try to make that as difficult as possible" over the next several months.

The plan to "increase security" in the Kandahar region would involve "a lot of political activities as well," he said.

Referring to "complex" political conditions in Kandahar, he said coalition forces would be working "to shape the political relationships in and around Kandahar," but offered no details.

US military officers and officials privately acknowledge Kandahar's local leadership has a reputation for corruption that will pose a challenge for any attempt to counter the influence of Taliban militants.

US commanders had touted an offensive launched last month in Marjah in the neighboring Helmand province partly by depicting the provincial governor there as honest and effective.

But officers have said carrying out a similar operation in Kandahar would be much more daunting given the corruption charges swirling around President Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai.

Karzai's brother, the head of Kandahar's provincial council, has been dogged by allegations he has ties to the illegal opium trade.

---

Pendant ce temps les talisurgés essaye de reprendre le controle des bourg de la province de MArjah

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/world/asia/18afghan.html?pagewanted=print

Retaken Afghan Town Reports Taliban Threats

By ROD NORDLAND

KABUL, Afghanistan — The Taliban have begun waging a campaign of intimidation in Marja that some local Afghan leaders worry has jeopardized the success of an American-led offensive there meant as an early test of a revised military approach in Afghanistan.

The Taliban tactics have included at least one beheading in a broader effort to terrorize residents and undermine what military officials have said is the most important aim of the offensive: the attempt to establish a strong local government that can restore services. The offensive ousted the Taliban from control of their last population center in southern Helmand Province, but maintaining control over such territory has proved elusive in the past.

Though Marja has an occupation force numbering more than one coalition soldier or police officer for every eight residents, Taliban agitators have been able to wage an underground campaign of subversion, which residents say has intensified in the past two weeks.

“After dark the city is like the kingdom of the Taliban,” said a tribal elder living in Marja, who spoke on the condition of anonymity out of fear of the Taliban. “The government and international forces cannot defend anyone even one kilometer from their bases.”

The new governor of Marja, Haji Abdul Zahir, said the militants were now holding meetings in randomly selected homes roughly every other night, gathering residents together and demanding that they turn over the names of anyone cooperating with the authorities.

Mr. Zahir said the Taliban also regularly issued “night letters,” posted at mosques or on utility poles, warning against such collaboration, and often intimidated residents into providing them with shelter and food, even in densely populated neighborhoods of the city, which has a population of 80,000.

“They are threatening and intimidating these people who are cooperating,” he said in a telephone interview. “They have been involved in the area for a long time and they know how to intimidate people. They threaten them with beheadings, cutting off hands and feet, all the things they did when they were the government.”

More than 6,000 American soldiers, Marines and British soldiers fought their way into Marja beginning Feb. 13, along with thousands of Afghan troops and police officers. Many others have reinforced the occupation since to protect an influx of Afghan officials and Western experts to build an effective government in Marja. That effort to win over the local populace is at the heart of the American and Afghan government strategy, and NATO officials have said it is proceeding well.

Journalists have still not been allowed to visit Marja independently, however; they must be embedded with the American military. Marja is meant to be a template for a similar campaign aimed for spring in neighboring Kandahar Province, the Taliban’s heartland.

NATO and Marine Corps spokesmen did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the situation in Marja.

Mr. Zahir said it was difficult for the authorities to counter the Taliban’s campaign because the militants were mostly moving around without guns, relying on fear rather than threats. “If they are detained, they claim they are just ordinary citizens,” he said. “At the same time, they still have a lot of sympathy among the people.”

He said it was impossible to estimate how many Taliban fighters remained in the city. “It’s like an ant hole,” he said. “When you look into an ant hole, who knows how many ants there are?”

The tribal elder declared that in his area, called Block 5, the Taliban had complete freedom of movement after dark. He said he believed that was true in many other parts of the city as well. He and the governor were among five community leaders in Marja who expressed similar concerns about the Taliban intimidation campaign.

On March 10, the elder said, a resident of the same area named Nissar Ahmad, 25, was abducted from his home and beheaded, and his body was dumped at night next to the main local school, where residents would be certain to see it in the morning.

“I saw his body myself,” the elder said, adding that he had heard of other beheadings. Mr. Ahmad had previously been a Taliban supporter but had switched allegiance after the city fell, the elder said.

Mr. Zahir dismissed reports of beheadings as rumors. Mr. Ahmad, he maintained, was killed as the result of a personal dispute. However, he said there had been Taliban beatings, including that of a teacher at a new school who was severely beaten on Tuesday.

Walid Jan Sabir, the Afghan member of Parliament for Marja and the surrounding Nad Ali District, said he had heard reports from Marja elders visiting his office in Kabul this week of two beheadings of pro-government elders, both members of the government’s Community Development Council.

Mr. Sabir scoffed at Mr. Zahir’s denial of beheadings, saying, “He is not from the area and he is only staying in his office so he doesn’t know what is happening.” Mr. Zahir lived for many years in Germany, where court officials said he was jailed for stabbing a stepson. Mr. Zahir has denied that.

A spokesman for the Interior Ministry, Zemarai Bashary, said the police in Marja had been told to investigate the beheading reports.

“We don’t know if it’s one person or many cases and many persons, but we are investigating and we will soon have an answer,” he said.

The Marja elder also said there were many accounts of the Taliban’s forcing residents to attend night meetings where they threatened retaliation against anyone cooperating with the government or NATO and warned that anyone who took even a low-paying government job would have his earnings confiscated. Mr. Zahir said there were many accounts of such confiscations from new employees in government work programs.

The elder said most people in Marja supported the government’s efforts to restore control, but most were also afraid to challenge the Taliban.

“I’m not saying the Taliban will win this war,” he said. “If the government strengthens their positions and creates small bases all over town close to one another and then permanently patrols between these bases, they can get rid of the Taliban.”

Mr. Sabir was critical of American and Afghan forces for surrendering the night. “At night the local people are the hostages of the Taliban,” he said. Since many tribal leaders have fled out of fear, and many of the Afghan officials coming in now are not from Marja, it is difficult for them to know who the Taliban activists are.

“The Taliban and the Marja residents all have beards and turbans so it’s impossible to distinguish them,” he said. “If it goes on like this I’m sure the situation will deteriorate and we’ll find it’s chaos there again.”

[collectionneur]

Retour à la ''rusticité'', les Néerlandais utilisent des mulets pour le transport comme les locaux  :oops:

http://guerres21.canalblog.com/archives/2010/03/12/17257006.html

[g4lly]

Retour à la ''rusticité'', les Néerlandais utilisent des mulets pour le transport comme les locaux  :oops:

http://guerres21.canalblog.com/archives/2010/03/12/17257006.html

[Serge]

Voici une confirmation de ce que je disais hier:

http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/defense/2010/03/polémique-sur-les-sections-larmée-de-terre-à-lère-quaternaire.html

Trois ou quatre groupes dans chaque section d'infanterie ? Le général Irastorza, chef d'état-major de l'armée de terre, est convaincu que la section à quatre groupes doit être le pion de base dans le cadre d'engagement majeur, comme l'Afghanistan. Un témoignage nous est parvenu, selon lequel lors d'une démonstration devant le chef d'état-major des armées et celui de l'armée de terre, des sections à quatre groupes avaient été spécialement formées, alors qu'au quotidien l'entrainement se déroulait à trois groupes. D'abord constesté, ce témoignage décrit ce qu'il s'est passé, confirme aujourd'hui l'armée de terre. 

Devant l'émotion suscitée par ce post, il nous a semblé utile d'avoir un point de vue officiel. Voici la réponse du colonel Benoît Royal, chef du Sirpa-Terre.

...

http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/defense/2010/03/polémique-sur-les-sections-larmée-de-terre-à-lère-quaternaire.html

[P4]

Un petit cadeau de départ, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,684669,00.html .

[aqva]

Salut,

Que pensez vous de ca?

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/files/4gwmanuals/FMFM-1A%20%20.pdf

[Serge]

Que pensez vous de ca?

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/files/4gwmanuals/FMFM-1A%20%20.pdf

Hi hi hi. Sitôt j'ai vu le blason impérial, de nombreux souvenirs me sont revenus.

Lind a théorisé un découpage en générations de l'histoire des conflits. Ce que Lind nomme guerre de 4ème génération est désignée guerre parmis les populations (même si ce n'est pas aussi simple surtout en France).

A titre personnel, je fais partie du courant de 4ème génération.

Les documents doctrinaux impériaux sont un outil de présentation/démonstration de la forme qu'une doctrine de 4ème génération pourrait revêtir. 

[Gibbs le Cajun]

quand n'est-il de l'offensive dans le sud ?

[loki]

Selon le site wiki sur l'offensive, la ville de Marja est prise mais la région reste soumise à des combats de harcélement par la guerrilla talibane

les pertes OTAN ont été trés lourde en janvier et février ( en augmentation de 100% par rapport à celles de l'années précédente pour la même période ) et restent en augmentation en mars......

les pertes talibans sont inconnues

[g4lly]

quand n'est-il de l'offensive dans le sud ?

Le gros de l'opération en province de Marjah est terminé, le relai passe au troupe locale. Le gros de la force a déjà engagé a pas de loup son opération en province de Kandahar.

Mais les probleme de fond persiste. Sitot l'ISAF et l'ANA dégarnissent, les talibans reviennent faire pression sur les civils pour regagner leur autorité.

Tout est expliqué ici http://www.air-defense.net/forum/index.php/topic,12089.msg429205.html#msg429205

[Babou]

es pertes OTAN ont été trés lourde en janvier et février

en parlant de pertes si on regarde bien pour nous, nous avons un ratio de 1 mort pour 10 blessés d'après les chiffres EMA repris dans le HS Raids... puisque nous avons 40 morts a ce jour et 380 blessés de 2001 a 2009...  :-[

[Gibbs le Cajun]

Le gros de l'opération en province de Marjah est terminé, le relai passe au troupe locale. Le gros de la force a déjà engagé a pas de loup son opération en province de Kandahar.

Mais les probleme de fond persiste. Sitot l'ISAF et l'ANA dégarnissent, les talibans reviennent faire pression sur les civils pour regagner leur autorité.

Tout est expliqué ici http://www.air-defense.net/forum/index.php/topic,12089.msg429205.html#msg429205

merci  =)

[P4]

'It was like Zulu'

How British troops in Afghanistan fought to the point of exhaustion against the Taliban.

By Sean Rayment

Published: 7:11PM GMT 20 Mar 2010

It became known as “the battle of Crossing Point One”. In a series of suicidal attacks late last year, hard-core Taliban fighters tried to over-run an isolated British base on the northern tip of Nad e’Ali. Had the insurgents succeeded, the victory would have been a propaganda coup par excellence, and the British mission in central Helmand could have been seriously jeopardised.

For two gruelling weeks in the area of Luy Mandah, 30 soldiers fought a 360-degree battle with the Taliban in the most arduous conditions. The combat was often at close quarters where bayonets were fixed and hand grenades became the weapons of choice for the beleaguered British troops. By the battle’s end, every man in the platoon was credited with at least one Taliban kill

The battle proper began on the night of November 4 last year, just a few hours after five members of the battlegroup in another part of the district were shot dead by a rogue Afghan policeman. The troops’ morale had been dented three weeks earlier when a member of their company had been fatally wounded by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Such was the force of the blast that Guardsman Jamie Janes suffered a quadruple amputation. As the troops carried Janes’s shattered body back to their base, they were ambushed by Taliban. Scores needed to be settled.

The troops from 5 Platoon No 2 Company 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, commanded by Lieutenant Craig Shephard, 24, and Sergeant Dean Bailey, 36, decided to exploit the Taliban’s fondness for attacking wounded soldiers by constructing an ambush based on a fake IED strike. After the explosives were detonated, the Taliban – as expected – quickly appeared with a two-man Pakistani sniper team leading the way. As the British troops pulled back to the base, the Pakistanis were shot dead by hidden British snipers – both dispatched with head shots from 400 metres. When the Taliban pushed forward towards the base, they were cut down by raking machine-gun fire and Javelin missiles. After two hours of fighting, 10 Taliban lay dead.

“The ambush was a case of thinking out of the box,” recalled Lt Shephard. “We wanted to outsmart them by using their tactics. We knew that they would ambush what they thought was an IED attack so we set up a trap.”

The following day, the platoon commander led a patrol to assess the damage. But this time the Taliban was waiting. “At the time, I called it a 'simple patrol’ – I will never use that phrase again,” said Lt Shephard. As the patrol pushed into enemy territory, it was ambushed. Accurate and sustained machine-gun fire and barrages of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) kept the troops pinned down for almost an hour.

“The fire was so intense and accurate – we simply couldn’t move,” recalled Sgt Bailey. “If we had tried to move, we would have been cut to pieces.”

The troops eventually managed to withdraw after a smoke screen was laid by mortar fire. But as they pulled back to the relative safety of the base, the Taliban attacked in force.

“You couldn’t make it up,” the sergeant added. “There were four sangar [sentry posts] in the corners of our compound being hit at the same time. It was 360-degree warfare.”

As the base came under intense fire, a group of Taliban used an irrigation ditch to move up to one of the compound’s rear walls. There was a real risk that the insurgents might breach the base’s security. With little thought for his personal safety, and knowing that drastic action was required, Sgt Bailey, with two of his corporals, filled their ammunition pouches with grenades, fixed bayonets, and charged 50 metres across a field to reach the wall behind which dozens of Taliban were preparing for an assault.

“We lobbed high-explosive grenades into the ditch from behind the wall. It worked. We killed or injured them all,” said Sergeant Bailey.

The fighting lasted for most of the day. By sunset, the British troops estimated they had killed another 30 Taliban – bringing the number of enemy dead to 40 in less than 24 hours.

Back in enemy territory, a force of around 100 to 150 Taliban fighters – including Chechens, Arabs and English-speaking Islamists from south Asia – was preparing more attacks. Their original plan was to create havoc for the second round of the presidential elections, but after they were cancelled, Taliban commanders focused their attention on Crossing Point One.

The battle continued for days with such regularity that the soldiers knew that it would begin in the morning after breakfast, followed by a lull at midday, and would then continue until sunset. “It was like Zulu,” said Sgt Bailey. “The Taliban just kept coming and coming. It was suicidal. The more they sent, the more we killed.”

As the assaults continued, commanders were forced to trawl the whole of Helmand for Javelin missiles, a high-powered rocket used against enemy forces hiding in compounds. In two months of fighting, 4 Platoon fired 47, more than the rest of the British force in Helmand combined.

As the days passed, some of the men became exhausted. Back at the main company location in Patrol Base Shaheed, the officer commanding No 2 Company, Maj Richard Green, pulled some of his men out of the front line just for a few hours’ rest. There was a real danger that battle fatigue might take root.

“I started to rotate the guys after a week. They were shattered. But it was everything you wanted from leadership. The guys were tested to the limit – no one let me down.”

Lt Shephard, who joined the Army in 2007, said: “Every platoon commander wants to come to Afghanistan and have 'their fight’. But you have to be careful what you wish for. We were lucky. We got away without any serious casualties.”

Today, in Nad e’Ali, life for the British soldiers has undergone a transformation. When I visited the Grenadier Guards Battlegroup last November, troops were coming under fire every day. At the height of the fighting, insurgents were launching more than 200 attacks a week. Hundreds of IEDs were laid in swathes across Helmand, turning huge areas of the province into “no-go” areas for British troops.

The Taliban ruled large areas of the district, taxing locals and punishing – sometimes executing – anyone who had dealings with the Nato-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF).

Now markets and bazaars, which were empty during the Taliban years, are beginning to flourish. Roads that were riddled with booby traps have been cleared of IEDs by British bomb disposal experts and are safe for the first time in years.

Following the murder of five members of the battlegroup by a rogue Afghan policeman last November, there was a clear-out of the local force. Three commanders were dismissed, and all police officers were tested for drugs. Those who tested positive were sacked, leaving the district with just 35 policemen. Today, following the creation of a new “academy” in Lashkar Ghar, the provincial capital, 550 newly trained policemen help enforce law and order.

Every young man wants to earn money, especially since in Afghanistan, no dowry means no wife. More than 4,000 local Afghans have registered for cash-for-work programmes. And the seed distribution centre, designed to offer an alternative to growing poppy, attracts hundreds of farmers every week.

Last November, travelling the three miles from Forward Operating Base Shawqat, in the Nad e’Ali district centre, to Shamal Storei took six tortuous hours in the sweltering rear of a Mastiff armoured carrier. Today, the same journey can be completed in 35 minutes.

The guardsmen of No 2 Company who fought so valiantly in Luy Mandah last November are now – like the majority of the troops in the battlegroup – providing the security that will allow the population to live a relatively normal existence.

The change is largely due to the success of Operation Moshtarak, the large Nato offensive into central Helmand that, since it was launched last month, has forced the Taliban from their safe havens. Moshtarak, which at its height involved up to 15,000 troops, formed part of General Stanley McChrystal’s plan for winning the hearts and minds of the Afghans under a strategy known as the “comprehensive approach”.

In simple terms, the strategy is designed to secure population centres and open up the roads linking them so that their inhabitants can move freely without fear of intimidation. At the moment, in Nad e’Ali and central Helmand, the plan appears to be working. Success here is vital; it is one of the three areas that form the British Army’s main effort in Helmand, and there is no Plan B. Failure could scupper Nato’s entire Afghan strategy.

“What has happened in Nad e’Ali goes beyond all our expectations,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Roly Walker of the Grenadier Guards Battlegroup. “Some of the roads in the district were impassable. If you wanted to drive, you would need a full convoy, attack helicopters providing top cover, and you would still have been hit by the mother-of-all ambushes – you wouldn’t have made it. Now we have this eerie freedom of movement – we can go anywhere.”

In many respects, Moshtarak was the easy part. Operations prior to the main event had given the Taliban a taste of what was to come, and many fled the area before the main assault.

The real work in winning the hearts and minds of the locals, especially those who either sympathised or grudgingly accepted the Taliban, is beginning in earnest. In the bazaar that runs through the centre of Nad e’Ali, there is a sense of optimism among the store-holders that was absent before Operation Moshtarak. Ja Mohammad, the owner of the bakery that produces delicious two-foot long nan breads at a seemingly impossible rate, was delighted: “I am very happy. Life was good before, but now it is much better. There is better security and we are very happy.”

Khan Mohammad, who owns a general store in another part of the bazaar, seemed equally optimistic: “Under the Taliban, life was not very good. But business is good now. I can make money and send my children to school, so I’m happy.”

Habi Bullah, Nad e’Ali’s irrepressible district governor, has – with the help of British mentors – created a functioning bureaucracy with separate departments responsible for housing, finance, irrigation, the judiciary and prosecutions. For the first time in many years, real governance is beginning to arrive in the area.

But significant problems remain. Most families want their sons – and to some extent their daughters – to be educated, yet manual workers clearing ditches can earn more than high-school teachers. The failure to bring electric power to vast swathes of the province remains a bone of contention.

Many of the locals are yet to be convinced that ISAF is committed for the long-term. For many, the Taliban remains the safest bet because, unlike the ISAF troops, they will never leave Afghanistan.

At a sura, a meeting of elders, last Sunday afternoon in Patrol Base Shahzad in Chah-e-Anjir, Lt Col Walker told the 200 villagers who attended that he was only interested in peace and stability. It was also a message to Taliban fighters who were attending.

“I have no argument with the Taliban,” Lt Col Walker told the silent audience. “If I could speak to the Taliban commanders, I would do it today. We would sit down like grown men and discuss our differences, and in the way of the world we would solve our differences by talking – not fighting. But I have offered and no one has come to my door. We are not here to fight the Taliban, we are here, at the invitation of your government, to protect the Afghan people. But if the Taliban attack us, we have a right to defend ourselves.”

The speech seemed to be well-received; some were keen to shake Lt Col Walker’s hand and thank him for bringing security to the region.

At Patrol Base Washir, which is surrounded by lush poppy fields on the fringes of Abdul Washid Kalay, Major Ed Bonas, the officer commanding the Inkerman Company, has also been attempting to win over the locals.

“When I first entered the village, I wanted to give them an unequivocal choice – they could carry on fighting and face the consequences of all that involves, or they could put down their arms,” said Maj Bonas.

“So far they have decided to do the latter. When we arrived they acknowledged that there had been no civilian casualties in their area, and they were grateful. They are looking at us to see what we do next – that’s why I call them floating voters. If we leave now we will lose their trust, and the Taliban will come in and say – 'we told you ISAF wouldn’t stay’.”

But “success” in Nad e’Ali has come at a bloody price for the battlegroup. Since September, 15 soldiers have been killed and more than 93 have been wounded. The companies have experienced more than 1,000 IED “incidents”. Despite the cost, most members of the battlegroup believe that the price has been worth paying.

So in the wake of Operation Moshtarak, it is a case of “so far, so good”. The success that the offensive delivered is limited and embryonic and it would be foolish to suggest that it amounts to “mission completed”. Helmand is still a very dangerous and unstable province. In the first week of March, six soldiers were killed in Sangin, and last week two more soldiers were killed by an improvised explosive device in Musa Qala.

Last Wednesday, there were two failed suicide bombing attacks on police and ISAF bases in Gereshk and Lashkar Ghar. All the indications suggest that the Taliban is attempting to mount a “spectacular” to blow Nato’s successes off course.

And while the Taliban have been pushed out of the centre of Helmand, it is likely it will re-emerge in another part of the province. The true test of the success of Operation Moshtarak will come in the summer when the crops begin to grow and the Taliban start to creep back into their former strongholds.

The summer has always been a period of what the Army defines as “high kinetic activity” war-fighting, and it is widely accepted that the Taliban will attempt to launch some sort of offensive. If the Taliban can separate communities by closing roads with IEDs, then much of the hard work and British blood that has been shed over the past few months will have been in vain.

The Taliban has already begun intimidating the locals – telling them not to take part in cash-for-work schemes, and taxing them if they do. And in Marjah there have been reports that returning Taliban commanders have beheaded locals for cooperating with ISAF troops.

In the school just yards from the British base in the district centre and supposedly one of the most secure areas in Helmand, the head master refused to allow pictures to be taken of his teachers, fearing that his staff might be targeted by the Taliban.

But after nine years of bloody fighting and the deaths of 1,600 Nato troops, including 242 British, the mission appears to be heading in the right direction.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7489393/It-was-like-Zulu.html

[Gibbs le Cajun]

effectivement ,impressionnant se combat .

on a l'impression que les talisurgés ont semblent-ils voulu faire un massacre avec cette section brits .

sa permet de se poser la question sur :

-ils ont leurs montres ,nous on a le temps ...

car mine de rien tenté de massacré une section compléte ,sa prouve que malgrés l'emploi d'IEDs ,les talisurgés semblent voir que la tactique a peut-être ses limites face au disposition et protection prise par les alliés (on a des pertes mais on ne peu pas non plus dire qu'il n'y a rien de fait contre ).

la presse relate les pertes par IEDs ,mais il y a peut-être une habitude dans l'opinion publique de l'entendre ,alors qu'une trentaine de gars massacré d'un seul coup ,sa ferait frémir ...

donc on peu se demander si les talisurgés ont vraiment le temps pour eux ...